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Identity and Commitment: Sen's
Fourth Aspect of the Self
JOHN B. DAVIS·

Amartya Sen has made examination of the behavioral foundations of
economics and their connection to three different interpretations of the
"privateness" of the individual a central theme of his work. He has also
associated this examination with the issue of how we might talk about the
self or the identity of individual. This paper argues that while Sen frames his
views about identity primarily in terms of social identity or in connection
with how individuals identify with others, his thinking about social identity
derives from his understanding of commitment and its association with a
fourth aspect of the self that provides the basis for an account of individual
or personal identity. The key to this argument lies in how Sen extends
his "privateness" framework to distinguish this fourth aspect of the self as
different in kind from the three standard, self-interest-based aspects of the
self employed in neoclassical behavioral models. This fourth aspect of the
self, or "commitment self," is linked to Sen's emphasis on individuals being
able to engage in reasoning and self-scrutiny. Individuals understood in
terms of this capacity, however, can be seen to be distinct and re-identifiable
beings, and thus be said to have personal identities. Seeing them in this way,
moreover, links to Sen's later thinking about functionings and capabilities,
and makes it possible to argue that the capability framework either employs
or can make use of an understanding of personal identity. This paper
offers an interpretation of this possible identity framework for Sen, and
also briefly discusses how it might be used to address one of the leading
criticisms of Sen's approach to thinking about capabilities, namely, that it
lacks a short-list of essential capabilities.
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Section 1 first reviews Sen's "privateness" framework and its relation
to commitment, considers recent criticisms of the idea that commitment
stands outside of this framework, and then considers how the different
forms of "privateness" and commitment differ in terms of individual selfregard and reflexivity. Section 2 discusses Sen's views on identity as social
identification and suggests ways in which these views are connected to his
thinking about individual identity and rationality. Section 3 sets forth my
earlier application of collective intentionality analysis to account for Sen's
thinking about personal and social identity. Section 4 provides a related
but different interpretation of Sen's thinking about personal and social
identity that rather emphasizes the concept of commitment, and draws
on Bernard Williams' understanding of integrity as based on identityconferring commitments. Section 5 briefly addresses Martha Nussbaum's
critique of Sen' s framework that it fails to identifY a short-list of essential
capabilities, and argues that understanding personal identity as a basic
capability provides one way of answering this critique. Section 6 offers four
concluding comments on the paper's motivations.

The "privateness" framework and the
fourth aspect of the self
1.

Sen distinguishes three aspects of the self or concepts of the person that
operate in one form or another in standard economics' characterizations
of self-interest, and then contrasts all three with a fourth aspect of the self
and concept of the person associated with commitment (Sen 1985; 2002:
33-7, 206- 2 4). The three standard types of "privateness" and aspects of
the self are:
Self-centered welfare: A person's welfare depends only on her own conswnption and
other features of the richness of her life (without any sympathy or antipathy toward
others, and without any procedural concern).
Self-welfare goal: A person's only goal is to maximize her own welfare.
Self-goal choice: A person's choices must be based entirely on the pursuit of her own
goals. (Sen 2002 : 33-4)

Though Sen finds that these different aspects of the self are often lumped
together and not well distinguished in standard economics, he shows that
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they are independent from one another in a number of ways, and can play
distinct roles in different behavioral models.
Sen's fourth concept of the self is associated with individuals making
commitments. He originally introduced the concept of commitment by
contrasting sympathy and commitment (Sen 1977), but with his subsequent distinction between self-welfare goal and self-goal choice-both of
which make individual well-being depend upon something other than the
individual's own consumption and self-centered welfare-making choices
based on one's commitments comes to be understood to be a matter of
making choices irrespective of any kind of personal gain or loss. As he puts
it then:
Commitment .. . is concerned with breaking the tight link between individual
welfare (with or without sympathy) and the choice of action (e.g., acting to help
remove some misery even though one personally does not suffer from it). Sympathy
alone does not require any departure from individual-welfare maximization: but
commitment does involve rejection of that assumption. (Sen 1982: 8)
Taking all three of these forms of 'privateness' to generally be a matter of
individual self-regard, we might accordingly say that introducing commitment breaks the "tight link." between individual self-regard in any form
and individual choice of action.
Recently, however, the idea that commitment somehow escapes selfregard has been challenged. Philip Pettit (2005) focuses on Sen's distinction
between self-goal choice and commitment, and asserts it to be highly
implausible. He treats commitment as being either own goal-modifying
or own goal-displacing, sees the latter as closer to Sen's meaning, and
interprets commitment as putting aside one's own goals to act on those
of another. But he doubts it ever makes sense to say one could fail to act
on one's own goals, since one's acting on the goals of another must still
be a matter of acting on one's own goals. This charge, however, mixes
together something being one's own act and that act being one's own goal
by characterizing the former as one's own goal. Sen of course knows that
acting on the goals of another is one's own act and that intentional action is
goal-directed. But that an action is one's own goal in this intentional action
sense still allows for a distinction between acting on one's own particular
goals and ignoring those particular goals to act on goals of others. More
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generally, action need not always be self-regarding though it is nonetheless
one's own action.
A somewhat different criticism of commitment comes from Dan Hausman (2005) who argues that the concept of preference in economics is
ambiguous, but that if understood broadly as an all-things-considered type
ranking, it could accommodate commitment as one type of preference.
Hausman's proposal to sharpen the concept of preference is entirely reasonable, but it does not imply, as he allows, that commitment is necessarily
a kind of preference. In fact, Hausman understands his recommendation to
refine the preference concept as a strategic prescription designed to make
it easier to deal with the complexity of human motivation, and recognizes
that Sen has adopted a different, also reasonable, strategy toward this same
goal by distinguishing preference and commitment. That is, he does not
believe self-goal choice and commitment cannot be distinguished, and primarily disagrees with Sen over strategic objectives. We might note, then,
that Sen's objective as he has recently stated it is not so much to improve
the preference framework but rather to explain different formulations of
rationality as being due to differences over how one understands the domain
of reason (Sen 2005).
In what follows, then, I attempt to get at what this may involve by reexamining the structure of Sen's "privateness" framework and its relation to
commitment along two lines. First, note that his three types of "privateness"
can be ranked in the order he provides according to the degree to which they
emphasize an individual's own self-regard. Self-centered welfare concerns
only an individual's own satisfaction (or desire fulfillment), but self-welfare
goal allows other individuals' satisfactions to enter into an individual's
satisfaction through sympathy (or antipathy), and self-goal choice allows
for non-welfarist goals that are altogether removed from an individual
satisfaction (the pursuit of social justice). Second, if we emphasize the
reflexivity of "privateness" in terms of three ways that individuals affect
themselves by the choices they make, Sen's three aspects of "privateness"
can be ranked according to the degree to which this reflexive relation
incorporates considerations external to the individual. Only self-centered
welfare is independent of such considerations. Individuals affect themselves
by their choices without any external mediation. But with self-welfare
goal individuals affect themselves through concern for others' welfare,
and with self-goal choice individuals affect themselves through concern
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for matters that transcend individuals' welfare altogether. Thus, across the
three forms of "privateness," choice is increasingly non-self-regarding and
reflexively affects individuals through considerations increasingly external
to the individual.
Extending this double characterization of the three types of "privateness"
to commitment, then, we may add that commitment eliminates self-regard
understood as the individual's pursuit of own goals altogether as a dimension
of choice. But since the reflexivity of "privateness" is a matter of how
individuals affect themselves in the choices they make, is commitment, in
"breaking the tight link between individual welfare .. . and the choice of
action," still a reflexive relation? That is, does commitment's elimination
of self-regard also involve an elimination of any sort of self-referencing? In
fact, Sen's fourth aspect of the self and concept of the person associated
with commitment is quite explicitly reflexive. The fourth aspect of the self
considers individuals as being able to engage in reasoning and self-scrutiny.
"A person is not only an entity that can enjoy one's own consumption,
experience, and appreciate one's welfare, and have one's goals, but also an
entity that can examine one's values and objectives and choose in the light
of those values and objectives" (Sen 2002: 36).
Sen's clear coupling, as he also puts it, of "one's own reasoning and
self-scrutiny" (Sen 2002: 36) demonstrates that he sees his concept of
commitment as pre-eminently possessing a reflexive dimension. At the same
time, Sen associates commitment and self-scrutiny with the " problem" of
"the 'identity' of a person, that is, how the person sees himself or herseIr'
(Sen 2002: 215). Thus, to better understand this further connection, we
tum to Sen's stated views on identity.

2.

Sen on identity, commitment, and agency

Sen's primary way of talking about the concept of the identity of a person is
that of social identity, or the idea of identifying with others. Once one goes
beyond the trivial or logical concept of identity-the idea that an object is
necessarily identical with itself-"we shift our attention from the notion of
being identical to that of sharing an identity, and to the idea of identifying oneself
with others ofa particular group" (Sen I999b: 2). One source of this notion
of identifying with others in Sen's thinking is his ordering of aspects of the
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self and types of "privateness" in standard economics' characterizations of
self- interest. Thus, the long-standing emphasis in standard economic theory
on self-interest, he notes, excludes from the outset the idea that individuals
might identify with others in deciding on their objectives and making their
choices (ibid.). Yet if one intends to broaden the behavioral foundations of
economics, one may move progressively through a set of enlargements of
the individual, first, by opening the door to the idea that one's self-interest
may be influenced by sympathy (or antipathy) toward others (self-welfare
goal), next by including the idea that one's goals may include considerations
other than one's own welfare (self-goal choice), and fmally by supposing
that one may act on principles altogether removed from one's own personal
welfare as when one identifies in some way with others (commitment).
Thus, identification with others through commitment merely carries Sen's
ordering of types of "privateness" that underlies his classification of the
different features of the self but one step further. 1 At the same time,
this additional step is a significant one, not only in "breaking the tight
link between individual welfare ... and the choice of action," but indeed
in raising the issue of whether or how the individual even remains an
individual when identifying with others.
A second source of the idea of identifying with others is Sen's early
interest in multiple preferences and meta-rankings. One good reason to
suppose preference rankings are incomplete and at best offer incomplete
quasi-orderings is that individuals might have multiple preferences that they
cannot immediately reconcile. Sen's original interest in multiple preference
rankings stems from his desire to improve the behavioral foundations
of economics, analyze various moral dilemmas, and investigate social
cooperation, but his explanation of why we might have multiple rankings
is that we have multiple social identifications with others.
Conununity, nationality, race, sex, union membership, the fellowship of oligopolists, revolutionary solidarity, and so on, all provide identities that can be,
depending on the context, crucial to our view of ourselves, and thus to the way
we view our welfare, goals, or behavioral obligations. (Sen 2002 : 215)
We might then say that one sees oneself as a certain type of person, and
having different meta-rankings means one can also see oneself simultaneously as different types of persons. Note that seeing oneself as a certain
type of person suggests one is still a distinct individual, albeit under some
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description. Yet at times Sen's association of social identification and commitment threatens to undermine this interpretation, as when he asserts that
seeing oneself as a member of a social group goes beyond sympathizing
with members of that group, and involves "actually identifying with them"
(ibid.). 2 Indeed, this strong sense of social identification is important to his
view of the seriousness with which we need to look at the issue of our
having multiple social identifications, since having multiple meta-rankings
produces "conflicting demands arising from different identities and affiliations" (Sen 1999b: 30). From this perspective, we might thus say that for
Sen the issue of whether or how an individual identified with and having
commitments to others remains a distinct individual is a matter of whether
the individual is able to sustain a personal unity and integrity across these
conflicting multiple associations.
Interestingly, Sen suggests we might understand social identification in
terms of our use of first-person plural speech.
The nature of our language often underlines the forces of our wider identity. "We"
demand things; "our" actions reflect "our" concerns; "we" protest at injustice
done to "us." This is, of course, the language of social intercourse and politics, but
it is difficult to believe that it represents nothing other than a verbal form, and in
particular no sense of identity. (Sen 2002: 215; also cf. p. 41)
Since by "sense of identity" Sen means social identity, we have a suggestion here that social identity as reflected in first-person plural speech
might be understood in collective or shared intentionality terms. 3 Though
he does not develop this idea systematically, he nonetheless alludes to the
convention-based, reciprocal feedback framework used by some contributors to the collective intentionality literature (e.g., Tuomela 1995; Davis
2oo3a) when he comments on an apparent tendency in experimental game
theory for players to want to know the identity of fellow players (Sen
op. cit.). Thus he associates "we" language and social identification with
the notion that not only players' choices but also identities are somehow
mutually constitutive of one another in games. Sen's focus is on how
one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma games may become Assurance games, but if
we broaden the framework to, say, repeated game formats where the Folk
Theorem applies, or allow for pre-play communication considerations, all
sorts of results are possible, some of which it seems fair to say might make
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use of explanations of social identity in some form of first-person plural
speech, collective intentionality analysis.
Returning to the question of personal identity, then, how does Sen's
thinking about social identification fit with his emphasis on individual
choice as central to the behavioral foundations of economics? Sen maps
out his answer to this question in relation to communitarian critiques
of liberal theories of justice. Such critiques, he notes, have at times been
employed to argue that individuals' reasoning abilities are effectively captive
to their (pre-existing) social identities, which are "not a relationship they
choose (as in a voluntary association) but an attachment they discover, not
merely an attribute but a constituent of their identity" (Sandel 1998: 150;
quoted in Sen 1999b: 16). On this view, one's identity is something one
discovers-communitarians sometimes say 'perceive'-and the way that
one reasons then depends upon this identity. Sen's response to this is to
reject the false dichotomy it involves between perfecdy autonomous choice
and perfecdy determined choice.
The alternative to the "discovery" view is not choice from positions "unencumbered" with any identity (as communitarian expositions often seem to imply),
but choices that continue to exist in any encumbered position one happens to
occupy. Choice does not require jumping out of nowhere into somewhere. (Sen
1999b : 23)

That is, choice may be influenced but is not determined by social identification. Social identities are indeed important. So is choice.
But while we may agree with him about this in principle, one would
also like to know more about how this might be the case. Hints come
in Sen's characterization of the fourth aspect of the self associated with
commitment where he links "one's own reasoning and self-scrutiny" (Sen
2002: 36). We saw above that on this view a person is someone who is able
to "examine one's values and objectives and choose in the light of those
values and objectives" (Sen 2002: 36). As if answering the communitarians
again, this passage continues,
Our choices need not relentlessly follow our experiences of consumption or welfare,
or simply translate perceived goals into action. We can ask what we want to do and
how, and in that context also examine what we should want and how. (Sen ibid. ;
emphasis added)
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Note, then, that this ability individuals are said to have to stand apart, as
it were, from their goals and objectives in order to scrutinize and evaluate
them in a reasoned way gives them a status as agents that is absent in Sen's
first three aspects of the self. First, from the vantage point of the individual,
there is a fundamental difference between this sort of reflexive relationship
and those associated with the other forms of the self Sen distinguishes.
For self-centered welfare, self-welfare goal, and self-goal choice, when
individuals make choices they are affected by own consumption, sympathy
or antipathy, and non-welfare goals respectively. But individuals engaged in
reasoned self-scrutiny are not only ciffected but also ciffect themselves in virtue
of adding their evaluation of the effects of their choices upon themselves
to those effects themselves. Second, from the vantage point of others,
whereas reflexivity operates in Sen's three original aspects of the self in
terms of increasingly non-private, other-referencing sorts of considerations,
in the case of his fourth aspect of the self, reflexivity involves a relation
between an-at least loosely-identifiable social group and the individual
with a now elevated status as an agent able to engage in some form of
self-evaluation. I thus suggest that Sen's response to (strong) communitarian
thinking about individuals and their social identities is to say that individuals
have identities that are in some sense independent of their social identities.
That is, they have both social identities and personal identities.

3. Self-scrutiny, shared intentions,
and personal identity
Here I review the argument I previously used to develop a conception of
personal identity for Sen's capability framework (Davis 2002, 2003b: ch. 8),
in order to compare it to one that makes use of Sen's emphasis on individuals
as engaged in reasoning and self-scrutiny. That argument proceeded by
applying collective intentionality analysis to Sen's understanding of the
individual agent, and then asking how individuals thus understood might
be thought distinct and re-identiflable across change. The point of entry for
the argument was Nancy Folbre's "structures of constraint" interpretation
of individuals having multiple, conflicting social identifications. As she
expresses it:
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Individuals cannot be located by a single set of coordinates, because they operate
in many different collective dimensions, within many different chosen and given
groups. Nor can they be located by a list of all the given groups to which they
belong, by a simple "adding up" of separate positions. The interaction between
different dimensions of collective identity affects the choices individuals make
about which collective interests to pursue. (Folbre 1994: 52 - 3)

How, then, do individuals manage the "interaction between different
dimensions of [their] collective identity?" In her attention to women in
particular, Folbre stressed the need for women to be able to move back and
forth between their different roles, and not be confined to any single set of
roles. This suggests that women need to possess a special capacity not only
to be able to move between roles, but also to do so with versatility, that
is, to be able to move successfully in and out of often very different roles
without high adjustment costs to themselves and others. 4 Having a special
capacity of this sort would provide women (or individuals in general) a
measure of detachment and independence from their competing social
roles, but at the same time it would enable them to actively embrace these
different, often conflicting roles.
One way, then, to understand this special capacity as a combination of
independence and affiliation with groups is to apply collective intentionality
analysis to how women affiliate with social groups. Broadly speaking,
collective intentionality analysis examines how distinct individuals may
fonn shared intentions in their interaction with one another (c£ Gilbert
1989; Tuomela 1995). My approach to collective intentionality analysis
is to explicate the normal success conditions associated with flrst-person
plural speech or the use of "we" language. Particularly important here is
that such language is used in a perfonnative manner. To say that a fonn
of speech has a perforrnative character is to say that individuals not only
communicate in using it but also accomplish some action in doing so. Thus,
when individuals use "we" language to express intentions they believe to
be shared, they might be thought to be intent upon establishing some
shared understanding with others to whom their use of the tenn "we"
applies in regard to the content of the proposition they have expressed. For
example, if I say "we are happy with our work," I not only express my own
view about our work, but by including others to whom the "we" applies I
also suppose that others have the same view of it. Emphasizing the normal
success conditions associated with using flrst-person plural speech, then, is
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a matter of whether my action is successful, where an important indication
of success is that others do not challenge what I have said.
Individuals having a special capacity to move comfortably back and
forth across their different social affiliations may now be understood in
connection with their capacity to use "we" language. The capacity to
move comfortably across one's different social affiliations requires being
able to both identify with others and yet still preserve an independence and
detachment from them. On the one hand, the identification-with-others
side of this is captured in how the normal use of "we" language requires
identification with the intentions of others to whom this language applies.
On the other hand, an individual's expression of a collective intention
is still an individual's intentional expression, and since shared intentions
can only be formed by those who have them, such language also requires
that the individual have an independence and detachment from others
to whom their "we" language applies. We might thus say that under
normal conditions individuals freely constrain themselves in their expression
of collective intentions. Thus individuals might be said to have a special
capacity to move comfortably back and forth across their different social
affiliations when they are able to successfully exercise their capacity to
express collective intentions in social groups.
Needless to say, much more needs to be said about how having
a capacity to freely move across one's social affiliations can be related
to the capacity to successfully express collective intentions within the
groups in which one operates. Here, however, I want to emphasize
how anchoring an independence-preserving mobility across groups in
how individuals freely constrain themselves within groups-as captured in
the logic of normal expression of collective intentions-tells us something
about personal identity and Sen's views. One argument is that the concept of
personal identity requires some understanding ofindividuals apart from their
social identification with others, and that Sen's emphasis on individuals as
reflexively detached agents suggests a way of developing this understanding.
Let me now try to explain this in connection with individuals' expression
of collective intentions.
An individual's expression of a collective intention, it seems fair to
say, involves just the sort of reflexive self-scrutiny and evaluation of
own objectives that Sen emphasizes. When an individual asserts, "we
are happy with our work," it is normally the case that the individual
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considers whether individually expressing this intention aligns her or him
with what others believe about their work. s That is, the individual must
scrutinize and evaluate what she or he intends relative to what others
might intend. There are two reasons for saying that this distinguishes or
individuates the individual. First, the self-scrutiny involved in considering
one's own expression of a collective intention relative to what others intend
itself distinguishes the individual from others. In effect, the individual
distinguishes herself or himself in an exercise of comparative thinking.
Second, actually expressing a collective intention requires that the individual
freely bind herself or himself to whatever the content of that collective
intention implies. But since only the individual can freely bind herself or
himself to something, this act is self-individuating.
The interpretation that I thus previously offered of Sen's thinking in
regard to personal identity begins with the problem of social identification, builds on his emphasis on individuals as agents having a capacity for
reflexive self-scrutiny, develops this idea in terms of individuals' expression
of collective intentions in groups, and explains this as a way of seeing
individuals as distinct and independent. The focus on a self-individuating
capacity-individuals having a capacity to not only move across social
groups while maintaining a relative independence, but also a capacity
within groups to freely tie themselves to the consequences of the collective
intentions they express-was meant to be a step in the direction of the
capability framework. My view was that individuals have the native capacities stated above, but may fail to succeed in exercising them, and thus fail to
develop associated capabilities. If we think of personal identity as requiring
that individuals be both distinct and re-identifiable beings, then individuals
who regularly exercise this self-individuating capacity in interaction with
others are re-identifiable in terms of this capacity. But individuals who fail
to regularly exercise this native capacity lack personal identities and lose
their status as individuals to their social identifications with others.
Thus, this interpretation of Sen's thinking makes personal identity a
particular capability among many that individuals may develop. I argue in
section 5 that it is a centrally important capability. What might be thought to
be missing from this discussion, however, is Sen's own emphasis on commitment. I consequendy tum in the following section to argue that many of the
same themes as appear in the analysis above re-emerge when we use Sen's
thinking about commitment to develop an account of personal identity.
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4. Self-scrutiny, rules, and integrity-conferring
commitments
Sen links commitment and the status of individuals as independent, selfscrutinizing agents, but he also links commitment to social identification.
How are these two ways in which he speaks of commitment compatible
with one another? Here I first review the development in Sen's thinking
about the concept of commitment from his early "Rational Fools" paper to
his later thinking that associates commitment and the self-scrutinizing aspect
of the sel£ Then I review Bernard Williams' thinking about commitment
that dissociates it from desire-e!1dorsement, and interprets it rather as an
identity-conferring behavior of the individual. Finally I draw these two
sets of views together to suggest an account of how Sen might be said to
understand personal identity and social identity in a manner that recalls the
collective intentionality-inspired account of these concepts in the previous
section.
4.1. Sen on commitment

As seen above, if we go back to Sen's "Rational Fools" discussion of
the concept of commitment, we find him primarily emphasizing the
idea that commitment "drives a wedge between personal choice and
personal welfare" (Sen 1977: 329). Comparing sympathy and commitment,
sympathy involves a concern for others that affects one's welfare directly,
while in the case of commitment one's welfare is only incidentally related
to one's choice and certainly not the reason for it. One way of expressing
this is to say that action based on sympathy is in a sense " egoistic" whereas
action based on commitment is by this standard "non-egoistic" (ibid.: 326).
Alternatively commitment involves "counterpreferential choice" (ibid.:
328), though it is still possible that acting on the basis of a commitment
may coincide by chance with the maximization of personal welfare. These
characterizations of commitment in terms of what it is not are supplemented
by suggestions regarding what might motivate commitment: a sense of duty,
one's morals, or a sense of obligation going beyond the consequences. At
the same time, Sen does not require that commitment draw on moral
motives, and emphasizes that morality or culture both offer individuals a
basis for the commitments they make. Indeed, in response to the suggestion
that we may have two kinds of preferences, subjective and ethical, with the
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latter reflecting a kind of impartiality (Harsanyi 1955), Sen notes that an
individual may be quite partial in making commitments to " some particular
group, say to the neighborhood or to the social class to which he belongs"
(ibid.: 337).
But Sen's explicit introduction of the reasoning and self-scrutinizing
aspect of the self after "Rational Fools" brings out a new and somewhat
different dimension to his thinking about commitment and identity. Thus
in one important later discussion, where he links the reasoning and
self-scrutinizing self and social identification, he also emphasizes the noninstrumental, "intrinsic importance ... attached to following certain rules of
behavior" that are operative in the groups with which one identifles (Sen
2002: 217n):

One of the ways in which the sense of identity can operate is through making
members of a community accept certain rules of conduct as part of obligatory
behavior toward others in a community. It is not a matter of asking each time,
What do I get out of it? How are my own goals furthered in this way?, but of
taking for granted the case for certain patterns of behavior toward others. (Sen
2002 : 216-17)

We might infer from this that only reasoning and self-scrutinizing individuals, who are themselves detached in this aspect of their selves from the
instrumentality of self-goal choice, are able to recognize in a correlative
manner that certain social rules of behavior also have non-instrumental,
intrinsic value. Social identification with others, Sen is arguing, presupposes
rather than eliminates individual detachment and independence from those
with whom one identifies, and it does so just because commitment to
others takes the form of a reasoned appreciation of the intrinsic value of
the rules operating in those groups. Commitment, consequently, is not an
unreflective type of attachment to others, but rather a rational recognition of rules associated with social membership that can only be achieved
by individuals who have distanced themselves from their own interest as
self-scrutinizing individuals.

4.2. Williams on commitment and integrity

The origins of recent interest in the concept of commitment are Williams'
use of it in his critique of the theory of action implied by act utilitarianism.
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Utilitarianism, he tells us, offers "a general project of bringing about maximally desirable outcomes," but leaves out certain other projects, interests,
and causes-both small-scale and large-scale-to which individuals commonly find they have made commitments (Williams 1973 : 110-11). This
omission cannot be remedied by attempting to interpret commitment in
utilitarian terms. While pursuing one's commitments may happen to make
one happy, "it does not follow, nor could it possibly be true, that those
projects [to which one is committed] are themselves projects of pursuing
happiness" (ibid.: 113). On one level, one's commitments "flow from some
more general disposition toward human conduct and character, such as a
hatred of injustice, or of cruelty, or ofk.illing" (ibid.: II I). But on another
level, an individual's commitments stem more fundamentally from "what
his life is about" (ibid.: I 16). Thus Williams comments,
It is absurd to demand of such a man [one with commitments], when the sums

come in from the utility network which the projects of others have in part
detennined, that he should just step aside from his own project and decision and
acknowledge the decision that the utilitarian calculation requires ... [T]his is to
neglect the extent to which his actions and his decisions have to be seen as the
actions and decisions which flow from the projects and attitudes with which he is
most closely identified. It is thus, in the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity.
(ibid.: 116-17)
One's commitments, then, are not only not instrumental to happiness
or other good consequences, but because they "flow from the projects
and attitudes with which [the individual] is most closely identified," they
additionally enable individuals to provide themselves a sense of their own
integrity as individuals.
As Williams (1981) later further developed this view, the 'identity view
of integrity', individuals have and act with integrity when they act on their
commitments-those motives, interests, and attitudes that reflect who
they are in the most fundamental way. Or, individuals act with integrity
when they make what Williams terms "identity-conferring commitments."
The emphasis in this idea suggests that commitment is a relation between
individuals and others that arises out of positions individuals reflexively take
toward themselves. 6 Because-or when-individuals make commitments
to others, they are able to confer identity upon themselves. Put the other
way around, if individuals fail to make commitments to others, they fail
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to create a sense of personal identity for themselves. But what are we
to say about individuals having different, often competing commitments?
Williams' answer, it seems, must be that while individuals' competing
commitments appear to fragment them, their very capacity for having
and making commitments per se invests them with integrity, which itself
makes them distinct and unitary beings. Indeed, in his original critique of
utilitarianism, Williams saw the absence of any account of the individual
as an agent as an important flaw. Utilitarian calculations always exhibit
an abstract, impersonal- even "churchy"-quality, tending to slide off
toward some kind of "impersonally benevolent happiness-management"
(Williams 1973: 110, I 12). Commitments, however, are generally made by
individuals? That is, by nature they are inherendy personalizing. Let us,
then, draw on this understanding of commitment to further develop Sen's
own understanding.

4.3 . Sen on commitment and identity
While their immediate concerns are different, with Sen interested in the
behavioral foundations of economics and Williams interested in moral
theory, they are both concerned to develop an adequate theory of action,
and both agree that the concept of commitment cannot be accommodated within the framework of utilitarian consequentialist reasoning. What
additionally appears to be shared between them is the view that personal
identity is dependent upon individuals being able to make commitments to
others, or, that social identification is a means to achieving personal identity. Whereas standard preference-based conceptions of the individual may
be seen as seeking to explain the personal identity of individual economic
agents atornistically, or apart from their interactions with others (Davis
2003b), the Sen-Williams commitment-based conception of the individual may be seen as seeking to explain the personal identity of individual
economic agents relationally, or through their interactions with others.
For both Sen and Williams this relational view of personal identity
relies on commitment having a reflexive dimension. Sen holds that only
reasoning and self-scrutinizing individuals, detached in this particular aspect
of their selves from the instrumentality of self-goal choice, are able to make
commitments to others, because only as individuals thus self-engaged are
they able to recognize the correlative, intrinsic, non-instrumental value of
social rules. Similarly, for Williams, individuals act upon themselves when
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they confer integrity upon themselves by making commitments to others
that put aside impersonal, consequentialist utilitarian reasoning. How, then,
does this reflexive self-scrutiny or identity self-conferral invest individuals
with personal identity? Taking distinctness as the fIrst and primary element
in any account of personal identity, the act of taking oneself as a separate
object of consideration is equivalent to treating oneself as distinct and
independent. When individuals adopt a position of reflexive self-regard,
they self-individuate themselves. For Sen and Williams, then, making
commitments to others individuates the commitment-maker.
This account of the individuation side of personal identity focused on
commitment is similar to the collective intentionality-based account of
individuation in the previous section. There I argued individuals have
a native capacity to freely self-constrain themselves when they express
we-intentions in social groups. That only individuals can freely selfconstrain themselves effectively distinguishes them as distinct individuals.
Here, commitment functions in essentially the same way. We might infer,
then, that commitment is an act in which individuals freely self-constrain
themselves to others. Thus it is interesting that Sen employs "we" language
(Sen 2002: 215) when he speaks of commitment and social identiftcation,
since this suggests that we are entitled to transfer the individuating character
of we-intention behavior to commitment behavior. Note also that I
suggested that individuals' being able to freely self-constrain themselves
to what their we-intentions require of them in social groups is a native
capacity. In terms of the Sen- Williams understanding of commitment, we
might accordingly say that being able to make commitments is also a native
individual capacity.
This raises the question of whether the second element in any account
of personal identity, namely, the re-identiftcation requirement, plays a role
in the commitment framework. In the collective intentionality account,
re-identiftcation is contingent upon individuals being able to regularly
exercise their capacity to freely constrain themselves in social groups over
time and across different types of social settings in which they participate.
That is, re-identification is a matter of individuals developing a special
capability. The commitment account of Sen's thinking, I believe, has a
slightly different emphasis, since while we may imagine that individuals lose
or fail to develop this special capability due to a variety of factors having
to do with the nature of their lives and experience and with the ways
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in which societies are organized, when we rather speak of commitment
it seems odd to say people are not always able to make commitments to
others. But if they are always able to form commitments to others, then
on the argument here they would always be re-identifiable as distinct,
commitment-making individuals, and would thus always have personal
identities. That is, having personal identity would not be a capability, but
rather a native capacity. In the section that follows, I rather opt for the
capability view of re-identification and personal identity as the preferred
interpretation of Sen's thinking about personal identity, and accordingly
assume that whether individuals are able to consistently form commitments
to others over their lifetimes depends on the same variety of factors having
to do with the nature of their lives and the ways in which societies are
organized. My grounds for this is that this makes whether individuals
have personal identities a contingent matter endogenous to the economic
process, and thus an object of social-economic policy. In conclusion,
therefore, I defme personal identity for Sen as a special capability whereby
individuals exercise a reflexive capacity to make commitments in social
settings in a sustained way.

5. Personal identity and the capability framework
A familiar and oft-repeated criticism of Sen's capability framework is that it
lacks a short-list of essential capabilities that, a la Aristotle, would provide
a single, universal set of policy recommendations regarding capability
development (e.g., Nussbaum 2003). Sen has consistently resisted the idea
that there ought to be an essential short-list of human capabilities on the
grounds of flexibility in application and social diversity, but this reply has
not been persuasive to some, perhaps in part due to the appeal of having
a single, essential view of the individual and a set of universal policy
prescriptions. In this section, then, I briefly attempt to reconcile these two
positions by arguing for the central importance of one capability: having a
personal identity. 8
One way of looking at capabilities takes them to be freedoms (Sen
I 999a). We have many freedoms according to the many capabilities we
develop. More generally, freedom is a central value and behavioral feature
of individuals according to Sen. Can individuals, then, be thought to be
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free beings if they are unable to generally sustain personal identities over
their lifetimes? The type of freedom at issue here is a positive freedom
to carry out one's plans and goals as an agent. In connection with the
concept of freedom, Sen understands being an "agent" not as in standard
principal- agent analysis, but rather in its "older-and 'grander'-sense
as someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements
can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives" (Sen 1999a: 19).
But if individuals are unable to regularly exercise a capacity to freely bind
themselves by the obligations and requirements of groups with which they
associate, or if they are unable to genuinely form commitments to others, it
is not clear how they can be regarded as agents able to act and bring about
change with achievements judged in terms of own values and objectives.
Thus it seems fair to say that the entire capabilities-as-freedoms framework
depends on the one central freedom or capability of being able to sustain
a personal identity. That is, underlying the development and exercise of
all our more particular capabilities is a general capability of being able to
freely sustain oneself in an environment that everywhere involves social
interaction.
The "Aristotelian" capability approach requires either a definite list
of essential capabilities or some hierarchical organization of capabilities
by importance. If we prescribe social policies aimed at ensuring that
individuals have opportunities to develop a personal identity capability,
then we indeed make one capability both essential and prior to all other
capabilities. But we do not go the full Aristotelian route by filling out
a complete list of essential capabilities or by organizing them in some
hierarchical order. There seem to be at least two reasons for applying
this reading to Sen's framework. First, it still preserves his intuition that
the capability framework works best when it flexibly accommodates social
diversity. Second, it reinforces the role of the concept of freedom in that
framework by further rooting it in a re-characterization of Sen's strong
sense of agents as beings who also seek to maintain personal identities.
As a reconciliation of Sen's and the more classic Aristotelian approach,
this strategy offers perhaps more determinacy in policy determination than
Sen's own open-ended strategy, is still Aristotelian in making one feature
of human life essential, but departs from Aristotle in providing a different
view of the good life, and in giving pride of place to the more modem
value of freedom.
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6. Concluding remarks
I close by way of brief comment on four general themes that motivate
this paper rather than with a summary of the discussion of the paper
itself. First, the paper follows a development in Sen's own thinking which
moves from an examination of standard economics' characterization of selfinterest to a fourth aspect of the self associated with reasoned self-scrutiny,
and which gives increased importance and meaning to the concept of
commitment. My view is that the issue of personal identity only emerges
once this fourth aspect of the self is clearly introduced, and introduced
in connection with the tensions it creates between personal and social
identity. Accordingly the paper takes the development of Sen's thinking
along this pathway to have itself created an agenda for examination of
personal identity where it formerly was absent. Second, as this previous
remark implies, the approach to personal identity here and in thinking
about individual behavior in economics in general need not recall the
approaches to personal identity taken in philosophy where in recent years
different sorts of issues have been investigated. Thus the treatment of
personal identity in economics may not, and it seems need not, conform to
other concerns about the concept in philosophy and elsewhere. There are
obviously many ways of talking about identity, personal and social, and the
discussion in this paper is intended to be specific to a particular history of
thinking about individuals in economics. Third, what seems to be key to
this particular history of thinking about individuals in economics is a failure
in most of the literature on the individual to ask whether individuality is
endogenous to the social-economic process. That is, this literature fails to
establish what makes individuals distinct, and this explains why much of
my discussion here and elsewhere makes the individuation requirement
a focus. Fourth, what especially distinguishes the treatment of personal
identity here is the emphasis on reflexivity. Partly this reflects the emphasis
that this concept possesses in thinking about individuals in economics, both
in standard economics and in Sen's thinking. But it also reflects what I
perceive likely to be the strongest route to successfully explaining individual
distinctness and independence given the various determining influences on
individual behavior. The discussion in this paper, then, aims to make this
concept central by bringing out its role in the development from standard
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economics' characterizations of the self-interest aspects of the self to Sen's
commitment sense of the sel£

Notes

* The author is grateful to Solange Marin, Ingrid Robeyns, Fabienne
Peter, Bernhard Schmid, and the referees for this volume for comments
on earlier versions of the paper. An earlier version of this paper appeared
as Davis (2004).
I. Note that Sen recognizes that not all commitments are to individuals but
may also be to such things as causes and principles.
2. This is reinforced in something of an aside where Sen suggests, following
Marx, that it might even be said that private interest itself is socially
determined (Sen 2002: 2Isn) . But Sen's treatment of the different senses
of "privateness" as all aspects of the self goes against this.
3. Anderson (2001) draws this connection, and links it to the concept of
identity in Sen.
4. For example, one might argue that an important dimension of antidiscrimination law in the United States with respect to women is
that it prevents employers from inquiring about family status, and thus
restricting or imposing high costs on their mobility between domestic
and employment roles.
5. Here I put aside complications associated with what happens when
normal success conditions are not fulfilled, such as when others disagree
but do not show it, when there is deceptive use of "we" speech, or
when one individual imposes a "we" statement on others. These kinds
of cases may be argued to be parasitic on the normal use of "we."
6. It can be argued that, for Williams, commitments need not be made
to others, but that individuals may simply have certain commitments. I
focus here on the case where commitments are at least implicitly made
to others.
7. However, Margaret Gilbert, in her contribution to this volume (ch. II),
argues for a concept of joint commitment.
8. For procedural approach to reconciliation that emphasizes social deliberation, see Robeyns (2003).
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